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THE LEGAL AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED
STATES FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION TO REGULATE
TOBACCO: CALLING ON CONGRESS
ROSEANN B. TERMINI*
Smoking has plagued America for generations, but the issue
has never received more scrutiny than in the past decade. The
rise of teen smoking1 and the long-term deleterious effects of
nicotine addiction2 prompted a national outcry for change. 3 As a
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served as a Senior Deputy Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Office
of Attorney General, where she handled trial and appellate cases and plain language
drafting. B.S., magna cum laude, Drexel University; M.Ed., Fellow, Temple
University; J.D., Temple University School of Law.
The author dedicates this article to her parents for instilling in her, at an early
age, the qualities of persistence and determination. She wishes to thank her
children, who, even at their young ages, understood her need to write this article.
Finally, the author gives special thanks to her dependable research assistant, Jill
Petrunak, J.D., 2000.
1 "[Alpproximately 3 million American adolescents ... smoke ... [cigarettes,
while] an additional 1 million adolescent males use smokeless tobacco [products]."
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398 (1996)
(footnote omitted) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, and 897).
"Eighty-two percent of adults who... smoked ... their first cigarette [did so] before
the age of 18, and more than half ... became regular smokers by that age." Id.
(footnote omitted). Additionally, of those adolescent smokers between the ages of 12
and 17, "70 percent already regret their decision to smoke, and 66 percent say that
they want to quit." Id. (footnote omitted).
2 For example, "[more than 400,000 people die each year from tobacco related
illnesses." Id. This means that "[tiobacco alone kills more people each year in the
United States than acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), car accidents,
alcohol, homicides, illegal drugs, suicides, and fires, combined." Id. (footnote
omitted).
3 President Clinton announced an initiative to reduce youth smoking which
contemplated the FDA's regulation of tobacco products under the Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act. See Remarks Announcing the Final Rule to Protect Youth from
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result, the United States Federal Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has asserted jurisdiction over the regulation of tobacco
products.4
The FDA, as one of the chief health regulatory agencies of
the United States, is determined to take action to curb the
nation's leading preventable killer.5 Due to the large number of
adults addicted to cigarettes, however, an outright ban on
tobacco would be both impractical and unrealistic. 6 Therefore,
acting on the findings of several major health organizations, the
FDA determined the best way to curb the United States'
addiction to nicotine was to stop it before it began.7 The
resulting tobacco initiative included the regulation of the sale of
tobacco products to minors, advertisement, and teen education
cataloging the dangers of tobacco addiction.8
The FDA's controversial regulatory scheme has prompted
more public comment than any other agency-proposed
regulation.9 Specific legislation granting the FDA authority to
regulate tobacco products, however, has not occurred. 10 Thus,
Tobacco, PUB. PAPERS 1332, 1333-34 (Aug. 23, 1996).
4 See Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These
Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 44,628 (1996)
[hereinafter Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination].
5 See id.; see also David A. Kessler et al., The Food and Drug Administration's
Regulation of Tobacco Products, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 988, 991-93 (1996)
(discussing the FDA's regulation restricting the sale and distribution of cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco to children and adolescents).
6 See Kessler, supra note 5, at 991. Health organizations estimate that "50
million Americans currently smoke cigarettes and another 6 million use smokeless
tobacco [products]." Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes
and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,398
(footnote omitted).
7 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,398-99
(1996) [hereinafter Regulations Restricting the Sale of Tobacco]. The FDA posed an
all out war on teenage smoking through regulations enacted to curb the sale of
tobacco to minors. See id. at 44,399-400.
8 See Kessler, supra note 5, at 991-93; see infra text accompanying note 39.
9 See id. at 988. More than 700,000 comments were received regarding the
proposed rules regulating tobacco products. See id.; Regulations Restricting the Sale
of Tobacco, supra note 7, at 44,557. The initial comment period for the FDA's
proposed regulation of tobacco products lasted 144 days. See id.
10 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 167 (4th Cir.
1998) (concluding that the FDA has no authority to regulate tobacco under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act), affd FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
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the final words regarding the regulation of tobacco will now
emanate from Congress."
The FDA based its jurisdiction over tobacco products on the
Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act's (FDCA) definitions of "drug"12
and "device."13 This article explores the ramifications of the
FDA's assertion of jurisdiction. First, it reviews why the FDA
has asserted jurisdiction over such products in the past and the
judicial decisions reviewing its action. Second, it provides an in-
depth analysis as to the Middle District of North Carolina's
opinion in Coyne Beam, Inc. v. FDA,14 which allowed FDA
jurisdiction, and the subsequent reversal by the Fourth Circuit in
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, which the United
States Supreme Court has recently affirmed. 15 It focuses on the
different approaches taken by each court in interpreting whether
tobacco products are a "drug" or "device" under the FDCA. This
timely analysis is crucial as the case was recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court.
11 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. at 1300, aflg 153
F.3d. at 176 (holding that the FDA does not have jurisdiction to regulate tobacco
products).
12 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (1994). The term "drug" in part means: "articles
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease in man or other animals; and... articles (other than food) intended to affect
the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals." Id. §§
321(g)(1)(B), (C).
13 See id. § 321(h). The term "device" is defined in part as:
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in
vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component,
part, or accessory, which is ... intended for use in the diagnosis of disease
or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, in man or other animals, or... intended to affect the structure or
any function of the body of man or other animals, and which does not
achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on
the body of man or other animals and which is not dependent upon being
metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended purposes.
Id. §§ (h)(2), (3).
14 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997), rev'd sub nom., Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998), affd 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
15 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. at 1316, affig 153
F.3d 155.
2000]
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I. BACKGROUND ON FDA TOBACCO REGULATION: THE WAFFLE
EFFECT AND THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S CHANGE IN
POLICY ASSERTING JURISDICTION
An indication that tobacco products posed a serious threat to
human health surfaced in 1964,16 when the Surgeon General
reported that smoking caused cancer in men and could also affect
women in the same way.17 Congress acted swiftly in response to
the report by passing the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act in 1965, requiring warning labels on all cigarette
packages.18  Soon thereafter, Congress banned cigarette
advertising on television and radio.19
The Surgeon General then began issuing new, more detailed
warnings,20 which prompted the Federal Trade Commission to
refine their labeling criteria to specifically reflect warnings about
health consequences. 21 The war on smoking evolved into a full-
scale attack when several states enacted indoor clean air laws,22
16 See OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO
THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964).
17 See id. at 31.
18 The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 required all
cigarette packages to warn, "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your
Health." 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964 & Supp. V 1970).
19 See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
20 Since 1964, the Surgeon General has issued 24 reports detailing the adverse
effects of smoking. One such report outlined the adverse affects of smoking in young
people. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PREVENTING TOBACCO
USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 6-7 (1994).
21 See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1988). Packages of cigarettes are required to bear
one of the following labels:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart
Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly
Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May
Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide.
Id.
22 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1300.21-.26 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (regulating
smoking in office workplaces); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 191.765-.777 (1999) (prohibiting
smoking in public places and meetings); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 202.2485-.2491 (2000)
(prohibiting smoking in public elevators, buildings, waiting rooms, stores, hotels and
buses); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1399-n to -o (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1999)




such as Pennsylvania's Clean Indoor Air Act,23 to combat
secondhand smoking's adverse effects.
The findings concerning the dangers of smoking were so
alarming that major health organizations declared war on
cigarette smoking.24 The FDA entered the battle several times
by asserting jurisdiction over tobacco products that promised
increased health benefits associated with their use.25  For
example, in United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons,26 the FDA
asserted jurisdiction over cigarettes that promised appetite
reduction and subsequent weight loss.27 The district court found
that jurisdiction had been properly asserted where the
manufacturer's promises were based upon such weight
reduction.28 The manufacturer intended the cigarettes to be used
for therapeutic purposes. The court held that this satisfied the
requisite intent of a drug under the FDCA as a product intended
to affect the structure and function of the human body.29
The FDA also asserted jurisdiction in United States v. 46
Cartons, More or Less, Containing Fairfax Cigarettes,30 when the
manufacturer claimed through advertising leaflets that
cigarettes were effective in preventing respiratory infections,
circulatory disease, and other physical ailments.31  This
advertisement was sufficient to bring the cigarettes under the
second statutory meaning of a "drug," which is a product
intended to mitigate or prevent diseases.32
23PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1230.1(a) (West 1993). Pennsylvania's Clean Indoor
Air Act regulates smoking in public settings and certain workplaces. See id.
24 See Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 4, at 44,634
(discussing how all major public health organizations recognize the addiction caused
by nicotine delivered through cigarettes and smokeless tobacco).
2 See e.g., Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (noting that "the FDA has asserted jurisdiction over cigarettes only when
health claims were made by the vendors or manufacturers").
26 178 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1959).
27 See id. at 850 (promising that a user can" '[s]afely lose up to twenty pounds
or double your money back' ") (citation omitted).
28 See id. at 851.
m See id.; 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994); see also supra note 12.
30 113 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1953).
31 See id. at 337.
32 The advertisement implied that smokers would be less inclined to contract
viral infections, like the common cold. See id. at 339 (determining that
manufacturers could not "reap" the rewards of therapeutic claims without bearing
responsibility for them); 21 U.S.C. § 321 (g)(1)(B); see also supra note 12 (defining
"drug).
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The fact that the FDA only asserted jurisdiction when
cigarette manufacturers promised increased health benefits,
prompted heated argument from a citizen's group called Action
on Smoking and Health (ASH). This group filed suit pushing for
the FDA's active assertion of jurisdiction over all tobacco
products.3 3 The 1980 litigation resulted in the determination
that the FDA lacked general jurisdiction over tobacco products.34
The court found no manifestation of the cigarette manufacturer's
intent " 'to affect the structure or any function of the body of
man.' "35 The FDA agreed that it lacked general jurisdiction over
tobacco products because ASH had presented no evidence proving
this requisite intent.36 The court interpreted the FDA's position
against general regulation of tobacco, not as an indefinitely
binding decision, but rather one reserved for a time when the
proper showing of manufacturer intent could be established.3 7
Thus, this decision should be viewed as an indication of how
times have changed, rather than as one that bars the FDA from
asserting jurisdiction.
The FDA asserted general jurisdiction over tobacco products
only after the majority of health organizations acted in concert to
declare nicotine's harmful effects.38 In 1996, the FDA issued
regulations to control teen smoking, including the prohibition of
the sale of cigarettes to persons under age eighteen and the
33 See Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(explaining that ASH, along with 13 other organizations and individuals, filed a
citizen petition requesting that the agency assert jurisdiction over all cigarettes
containing nicotine).
34 See id. at 243.
35 Id. at 239 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C)(1998)). The agency originally
rejected ASH's request based on this lack of intent. See id. at 240. The district court
agreed and denied the ASH petition. See id. at 243.
36 See id. at 239; see also id. at 240 (finding that ASH could not sustain the high
burden of establishing the vendor's intent "to affect the structure or any function of
the body of man" by consumer use). According to the court, ASH could meet this
burden with "subjective vendor claims or objective evidence such as labeling,
promotional material, and advertising," but not merely with consumer use. Id. at
239.
37 See id. at 239.
38 See Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 4, at 44,634. Several
organizations recognized the addictive nature of nicotine in tobacco products. See id.
The American Psychiatric Association began the movement in 1980. See id. Since
1981, the U.S. Surgeon General, the World Health Organization, and the American
Medical Association, among others, submitted information to the FDA regarding the
addictive properties of nicotine. See id.
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regulation of advertisement geared toward minors. 39 As the FDA
has based its jurisdiction on the FDCA's definitions of "drug" and
"device," a clear understanding of the problem requires a close
examination of these definitions.40
The FDA has met with litigation over the validity of its
assertion of jurisdiction over nicotine products.41  In Coyne
Beahm, Inc. v. Food & Drug Administration,42 the district court
determined, based on judicial history, legislative intent, and
product use, that the FDA properly asserted jurisdiction over
tobacco products.4 3 The Coyne court discussed the meaning of
"drug" and "device" under the FDCA and applied evidence of
foreseeable use, actual use, and manufacturer representations to
determine that tobacco products are intended to affect the
structure or function of the body.4 The court also found that
congressional intent reinforced their findings, based on Congress'
acquiescence to agency interpretation. 45 Manufacturers appealed
this ruling, maintaining that nicotine-containing products do not
fall under the definition of "drug" or "device" and thus, should
escape regulation by the FDA.46
Agreeing with the Fourth Circuit in Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Administration,47 the United
States Supreme Court held that the FDA lacked jurisdiction over
tobacco products, because the measure lacked the requisite
congressional intent required to execute the regulatory
39 See Regulations Restricting the Sale of Tobacco, supra note 7, at 44,396 (1996)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, and 897 (1999)).
40 See supra notes 29, 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing the
manufacturer's requisite intent to affect the structure or function of the body, which
is found in the FDCA's definition of device).
41 See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (M.D.N.C. 1997),
rev'd sub nom., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir.
1998), aff/d 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000); Beatty v. FDA, 12 F. Supp.2d 1339, 1341-42
(S.D. Ga. 1997).
42 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997), rev'd sub noma., Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998), affd 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
43 See id. at 1379-88.
4See id. at 1388-91, see also supra notes 29, 35-37 and accompanying text.
45 See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1391 (finding that "[tihe plain
language and the legislative history of the drug and device definitions do not reveal
that Congress clearly intended for FDA to rely only upon evidence of manufacturer
representations to establish intended use").
46 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998),
affd 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
47 Id.
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framework. 48 Both the United States Supreme Court and the
Fourth Circuit denied the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products
due to "fundamental conflicts"49  and several "internal
inconsistencies" 50 in the FDA's regulatory scheme. Thus, the
judiciary has determined that the FDA lacks jurisdiction over
tobacco products, despite its strong showing of compatible,
existing regulatory provisions and convincing evidence of the
danger of nicotine addiction.51
Examination of the FDA's asserted jurisdiction of tobacco
regulation requires an analysis similar to that in Coyne. This
analysis considers tobacco's foreseeable use, actual consumer use
of the product, and the content of internal manufacturer
memoranda.52 The serious health risks associated with tobacco
products and the unique hold tobacco has on Americans, warrant
a detailed examination of multiple factors, not simply
congressional intent. The district court properly considered
many factors in its determination, including the plain language
of the statute, the effect of tobacco on users, as well as,
congressional intent.53
The regulation of tobacco products poses a problem because
tobacco is a profitable business for the economy. The tobacco
industry generates fifty-four billion dollars in annual revenue.54
This wealth allows the industry to create tremendous political
48 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. at 1300-01.
49 Id. at 1302 (noting that because the FDA also claimed tobacco was unsafe, it
was impossible for it to implement regulations that would provide "reasonable
assurance[s] of safety"), affg 153 F.3d 155, 164 (4th Cir. 1998).
50 Id. at 1299 (discussing the FDA's vacillation in classifying tobacco both as a
"drug" or "device" depending on which classification suited their purposes at the
time), affg Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 164-67 (4th
Cir. 1998).
51 See id. at 1299, affg Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d
155, 167 (4th Cir. 1998).
52 See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1391-92 (M.D.N.C. 1997),
rev'd sub nom., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir.
1998), affd 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
63 See id. at 1391 (declaring that "foreseeability, actual consumer use, and
internal manufacturer memoranda" must be examined in addition to legislative
history and judicial construction).
54 See Peter S. Arno et. al., Tobacco Industry Strategies to Oppose Federal




pressure,55 in the form of lobbying, delays, and filibusters,
thereby forcing the failure of much tobacco legislation.56
It still appears that the FDA is the obvious choice to regulate
the tobacco industry, as the FDCA's broad regulatory authority
already grants the FDA the power to assert jurisdiction over
"drugs" and "devices."57 In fact, the FDA already regulates
almost every object placed into or around the human body.58 The
FDA maintains that cigarettes fall within the "drug" and "device"
classifications of the FDCA because nicotine is intended to affect
the structure or function of the body.59
Tobacco manufacturers objected to this assertion of authority
and claimed tobacco products simply did not fit under the
statutory definitions. 60 Despite previous court rulings, including
the recent landmark United States Supreme Court decision,
55 The tobacco industry also maintains a powerful agricultural impact and plays
a dominant role as large subsidiaries of other manufacturing companies. See id. It
also finances campaigns to influence the political process. See id. at 1261.
56 On May 18, 1998, Congress introduced the National Tobacco Policy and Youth
Smoking Reduction Act. See 144 CONG. REC. S5001 (daily ed. May 18, 1998). This
act was meant to "reform" and "restructure" tobacco production and marketing
processes in an effort to prevent the underage use of tobacco products. See id. The
bill subsequently failed on June 17, 1998, as a result of 40 million dollars spent by
the tobacco industry in lobbying to "hijack the process." 144 CONG. REC. S6485 (daily
ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Sen. Murray).
57 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(1), (h) (1994) (defining "drug" and "device" within the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act); see also supra notes 12-13.
58 The FDA regulates products that are "ingested, inhaled, implanted, or
otherwise used in close contact with the human body." Nicotine: Jurisdictional
Determination, supra note 4, at 44,628. This includes products such as "foods, drugs,
medical devices, and cosmetics" See id.; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(f), (g)(1), (h) and i)
(1994) (defining "food," "drug," "device," and "cosmetic" within the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act respectively). The U.S. Department of Agriculture also
retains regulatory authority over some specific foods such as meat and dairy
products. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-5106 (1994).
59 See Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 4, at 44,629.
60 See George Johnson, With Tobacco, It's Time to Trust Congress to Do the Right
Thing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 6, 1996, at B3 (noting that "[tihe tobacco
industry argues... that the FDA does not have the legal authority to regulate
cigarettes, as Congress has not specifically given the FDA the authority to regulate
nicotine as a drug"), available in 1999 WL 3027246; Robert S. Greenberger & Suein
L. Hwang, Court to Rule on FDA Role Over Tobacco, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1999, at
A3 (providing the legislative intent argument of tobacco manufacturers). Although
the district court in Coyne rejected this argument, the court of appeals agreed with
tobacco companies and concluded that the "FDA [was] attempting to stretch the Act
beyond the scope intended by Congress." Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA,
153 F.3d 155, 167 (4th Cir. 1998), affd FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
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which held that the FDA did not have jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco,61 new evidence of manufacturer representations and the
addictive qualities of cigarettes could now provide a basis for
Congress to accept the FDA's contention.62 The agency's new
findings and liberal interpretation of the FDCA make the FDA's
classification of tobacco as a "drug" or "device" proper and timely.
Further, the overall intent of the FDCA is premised on public
protection. As the United States Supreme Court in Kordel v.
United States63 enunciated, "[tihe high purpose of the Act [is] to
protect consumers who under present conditions are largely
unable to protect themselves."64 Nevertheless, the complexity of
the FDA assertion ofj-crisdiction over tobacco continues to spurn
argument and controversy.
The FDA determined that it had jurisdiction over tobacco as
a combination drug and device, as it considered nicotine a drug,
and cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products as drug delivery
devices. 65 The analysis of whether the FDA can validly assert
jurisdiction over tobacco products must be examined on two
levels. Despite the United States Supreme Court's ruling, the
61 See e.g., Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
62 See Jan Crawford Greenburg & Peter Gorner, Tackling Tobacco: The Supreme
Court Agrees to Decide One of the Most Contentious Health Issues in America-
Whether the Government Has the Authority to Regulate Tobacco, CHICAGO TRIB.,
Apr. 27, 1999, at 1 (discussing the Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari amid
the recent scientific findings), available in 1999 WL 2867370; see also Laurie Asseo,
Court to Rule on Smoking Dispute: Government, Cigarette Industry to Spar Over
Whether FDA Can Regulate Tobacco, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, April 27, 1999,
at 3 (noting that "[tihe government says... [there is] new evidence that the tobacco
industry intends its products to feed consumers' nicotine habits"), available in 1999
WL 6231880.
3 335 U.S. 345 (1948).
64 Id. at 349 (citation omitted). Other United States Supreme Court decisions
have recognized the importance of consumer protection. For example, in United
States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969), the Supreme Court stated:
[Wie are all the more convinced that we must give effect to congressional
intent in view of the well-accepted principle that remedial legislation such
as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is to be given a liberal construction
consistent with the Act's overriding purpose to protect the public health.
Similarly, in Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exchange, 358 U.S. 153, 158 (1958), the
Court declared: "We granted certiorari to determine ... construction of this
important statute designed for the protection of the public health." The circuit courts
have also recognized the importance of protection. In United States v. Bradshaw,
840 F.2d 871, 874 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. den. 488 U.S. 924 (1988), the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that "[t]he general scheme of the Act and its legislative history
indicate that the overriding congressional purpose was consumer protection."
65 See Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 4, at 44,629.
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initial inquiry still concerns whether the FDA should even have
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. A starting point for this
issue is to examine the statutory definitions of "drug" or "device,"
and determine whether nicotine-containing products meet these
criteria. Congress's impact on administrative regulatory
schemes also plays a vital role in determining whether the FDA
possesses the power to regulate tobacco.
The focal point of FDA regulation centers on nicotine, the
addictive ingredient in cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. 66 The
FDA maintains that tobacco products meet the "drug" or "device"
criteria because they are intended to affect the structure or
function of the body.67 The FDA issued these findings based on
information discovered from industry records and a consensus of
health organizations that have joined forces in asserting the
addictive properties of nicotine.68 The FDA further argued that
tobacco products meet the "drug" and "device" criteria due to the
manufacturer's intent for consumers to use their products as a
combination device.6 9
Although the Coyne court agreed with the FDA's assessment
in determining that tobacco products fall under the FDA's
jurisdiction,70 the Fourth Circuit and the United States Supreme
Court rejected this argument.71 The Supreme Court and the
court of appeals used very different approaches in analyzing the
problem of the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco than
66 See id. at 44,629.
67 See id. The American Medical Association (AMA) urged the FDA to regulate
tobacco products and help reduce nicotine's addictive potential. See Jim Ritter, AMA
Wants Nicotine Curbs, Goal: Less-Addictive Cigarettes, CIE. SUN TIMES, June 19,
1998, at 18, available in 1998 WL 5585925. The AMA noted that 70% to 80% of
smokers want to quit, but cannot because they are "hooked" on nicotine. See id.
(3s See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also Nicotine: Jurisdictional
Determination, supra note 4, at 44,629 (finding that there has been an "emergence
of a scientific consensus that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco cause addiction to
nicotine").
69 See Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination, supra section III (discussing
consumer use as a factor in assessing FDAjurisdiction over tobacco products).
70 See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1395-97 (M.D.N.C. 1997),
rev'd sub nom, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir.
1998), af'd 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
71 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. at 1299, 1301, affg
153 F.3d 155, 175-76 (4th Cir. 1998). The court of appeals did not discuss the
manufacturer's intent. See id. at 163 (noting only that the FDA did not assert that
the manufacturers intended their products to affect the structure and function of the
body).
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did the district court. Both courts determined that statutory
interpretation was the threshold of the analysis, and if the
legislative history did not encourage regulation, the product
should not be regulated.72 The district court found that the
FDA's theories of regulation comported with elements such as
foreseeable use and actual consumer use, which could not be
ignored.73 The Coyne court accepted the FDA's position that
relied on foreseeable use, actual consumer use, and manufacturer
representations to establish intended use.74 Furthermore, agency
interpretation and judicial decisions do not prohibit the FDA
from considering other evidence to prove intended use.75
According to the district court, the legislative history and the
definitions of "drug" and "device" do not indicate that Congress
meant for the FDA to rely solely on evidence of manufacturer
representations to establish intended use.76
The Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit, however,
rejected this analysis and narrowed the scope of inquiry to the
historical role and actions of the FDA in relation to tobacco
regulation and prior congressional actions.7 7  The courts
ultimately decided that the FDA lacked jurisdiction over tobacco
based on legislative intent,78 choosing to ignore the vital factors
of consumer use, foreseeable use and manufacturer memoranda,
and information from newly emergent scientific findings
concerning tobacco and its effect on the American public.
72 See id. at 1299-1300, affg Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153
F.3d 155, 163 (4th Cir. 1998).
73 See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1391-92.
74 See id. at 1391.
75 See id. at 1391-92.
76 See id.; see also Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984) (noting that "[o]nce [the court] determine[s], after its
own examination of the legislation, that Congress did not actually have an intent
regarding [the issue].... the question before it [is] ... whether the [agency's] view
... is a reasonable one").
77 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. at 1294-95, affg
153 F.3d 155, 160-70 (4th Cir. 1998). Since 1914, the FDA had continually asserted
that tobacco products were outside the scope of its jurisdiction unless marketed with
health claims. See e.g., Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Corp., 108 F.
Supp. 573, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd, 203 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1953).
78 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. at 1297, affg 153
F.3d 155, 175-76 (4th Cir. 1998).
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II. THE ROLE OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT OR CONGRESSIONAL
INACTION IN AFFORDING EXPLICIT AUTHORITY TO REGULATE BY
THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
Brown & Williamson rejected the lower court's analysis in
Coyne, as well as the FDA's contention that Congress' lack of
explicit delegation of authority to regulate tobacco did not negate
its jurisdictional authority.7 9 The Fourth Circuit stated that both
the FDA and the district court used only a "mechanical reading"
approach to interpret the definition of "drug" and "device" under
the FDCA.8 0 The United States Supreme Court and the court of
appeals recognized that the FDA was charged with protecting the
public health from harmful drugs and devices, but ultimately
rejected the FDA's chosen method of regulation.8 ' The court
determined that the FDA should weigh the risks and benefits of
the use of a particular product and not balance the effects of
removing that product from the market.8 2 The Supreme Court
and the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the FDA's interpretation
of why tobacco falls within its regulatory authority, and also
determined that the FDA lacked the power to make this "major
policy decision."8 3 Both courts concluded that the FDA went
beyond the authority granted to it by Congress. 84
The determination of the FDA's jurisdiction over tobacco
products focuses on an analysis of congressional intent. Despite
these judicial determinations, it seems that the nature of the
FDA's timely control, coupled with the broad powers of the
FDCA, indicate that the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction still
coincides with legislative intent.8 5  The Supreme Court in
79 See id. at 1298-99, affg 153 F.3d 155, 175-76 (4th Cir. 1998).
80 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 163 (4th
Cir. 1998).
81 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. at 1298-99, affg
153 F.3d 155, 163-64 (4th Cir. 1998).
82 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d at 164 (4th Cir.
1998) (noting that "[bly statute, the FDA's authority is limited to the balancing of
health benefits and risks"); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2)(C) (1994) (expressing that
the "weighing [of] any probable benefit to health from the use of the device against
any probable risk of injury or illness from such use" determines the suitability of
devices on the market).
83 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 153 F.3d at 176.
84 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. at 1313-14, affg
153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998).
85 See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1392 (M.D.N.C. 1991),
rev'd sub nom., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir.
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Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,8 6
set forth criteria for determining whether an agency's statutory
construction conflicts with congressional intent.8 7
The two-prong test established by Chevron for analyzing
congressional intent begins with a determination as to whether
Congress has spoken clearly on the issue at hand.88 If so, "that is
the end of the matter."8 9 If, however, Congress left a gap in the
statutory interpretation, or if the intent of Congress is
ambiguous, then the agency responsible for issuing regulations
may fill this void.90 Deference to the agency's regulations is
permissible unless the construction is "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute."9' Thus, a court may not
substitute its own statutory interpretation for that of the agency
if the agency's construction is reasonable. 92
Applying the Chevron analysis to tobacco regulation begins
with a determination as to whether Congress has clearly spoken
regarding the FDA's jurisdiction over tobacco products. The
United States Supreme Court agreed with the tobacco
manufacturers' contention that Congress never authorized nor
intended for the FDA to assert jurisdiction over tobacco
products.93 The Court further agreed with the contention by
tobacco manufacturers that if Congress intended the FDA to
regulate tobacco, then acquiescence to the FDA's jurisdiction over
tobacco would have been included in either the Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act,94 the Comprehensive Smokeless
1998), affd 120 S. Ct. at 1313.
86 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
87 See id. at 842-44. Chevron challenged the Environmental Protection Agency's
Clean Air Act and the stringent conditions on air quality as well as the use of
equipment to nullify pollution emitting devices. See id. at 840.
88 See id. at 842.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 843-44.
91 Id. at 844.
92 See id.
93 See generally Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1384 (M.D.N.C.
1997), rev'd sub noma., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th
Cir. 1998), affd 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000) (noting the manufacturer's contention that
"Congress' tobacco-specific legislation supports [the] argument that Congress clearly
reserved to itself the authority to regulate tobacco products"). There are several
examples of Congress enacting tobacco legislation, without explicit grant of the
authority to regulate tobacco. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4401-08 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (1994).
94 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. at 1298-99; 15
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Tobacco Health Education Act,95 or the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and
Mental Health Reorganization Act of 1992 (the "Acts"). 96 The
Coyne court found that the FDA's tobacco regulations did not
conflict with the text of the Acts.9 7 Additionally, the Acts did not
evidence congressional intent to withhold jurisdiction from the
FDA to regulate tobacco products.98
Second, the tobacco companies argued that because the
legislation failed to grant jurisdictional authority to the FDA,
Congress explicitly did not intend the FDA to have jurisdiction
over tobacco products.99 Despite evidence that Congress has
repeatedly failed to pass legislation granting such jurisdiction to
the FDA, the Coyne court rejected this argument,100 explaining
that unenacted legislation did not indicate congressional
intent.101 The United States Supreme Court and the Fourth
Circuit both disagreed with the Coyne court.
The lack of clear congressional intent forced the district
court in Coyne to move to the second prong of the Chevron test.10 2
The Coyne court examined the FDA's reasoning behind its
assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco as a "drug" and "device."10 3
Unlike the United States Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit,
the Coyne court accepted the FDA's argument that evidence of
actual use and foreseeable use constituted an independent basis
for "intended use" under the FDCA.10 4 The district court also
found that though the FDA had changed its position regarding
its authority to regulate tobacco products since the 1980 ASH
U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994).
05 See id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-08 (1994).
96 See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (1994).
97 See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1384-89.
9s See id. at 1388; see also supra note 76.
99 See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text. The power of the tobacco
industry can be seen in Congress' inaction. This inaction, however, does not mean
that Congress does not believe the FDA has the power to regulate tobacco. See
generally Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 632 (1993) (warning against drawing
inferences from congressional inaction).
100 See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1382.
101 See id. (citing Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994)).
102 See id. at 1388 (engaging in statutory interpretation in the face of a lack of
clear congressional intent).
103 See id. at 1392.
104 See id. at 1384.
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decision, 10 5 this change was not arbitrary or capricious' 06-the
Supreme Court determined otherwise.
The district court in Coyne relied on Chevron's reasoning in
noting that "[a]n initial agency interpretation is not instantly
carved in stone."10 7 Rather, "[an] agency, to engage in informed
rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the
wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis." 08 The FDA waited to
assert general jurisdiction until new findings of nicotine
addiction indicated scant scientific doubt regarding the adverse
effects of nicotine in tobacco products on the structure or function
of the body.'0 9
It appears that the Coyne district court's decision, unlike the
United States Supreme Court and the court of appeals in Brown
& Williamson, is consistent with previous rulings regarding the
jurisdictional determination of tobacco regulation, 110 which have
looked at jurisdictional determination within the context of
congressional intent."' As previously mentioned, "[a]n
105 See Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(discussing the FDA's refusal to assert jurisdiction over nicotine under section
201(g)(1)(C) of the FDCA).
106 Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1384 (describing the change in position
as "reasonable"); see also Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination: supra note 4 at
44,619, 45,219 (including new medical findings of nicotine's addictive properties
which helped to develop a new attitude toward the regulation of tobacco products by
the FDA). The Supreme Court in Chevron also articulated that an agency is entitled
to change its policies. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984).
107 Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1384 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-
64).
108 Id.
109 See Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 4, at 45,219-22.
110 See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1384; Action on Smoking & Health,
655 F.2d at 242 (recognizing the appropriateness of judicial deference to the FDA's
changing opinion). Further, Brown & Williamson gave little deference to Chevron,
and gave greater weight to the FDA's original refusal to assert jurisdiction. See
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 169-70 (4th Cir. 1998),
affd No. 99-1152, 2000 WL 289576 (U.S.N.C. Mar. 21, 2000).
M See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1384. The court discussed several
decisions, which examined drug and device regulation. See id. at 1388-92. One such
case was National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 330 (2d Cir.
1977), which examined vitamins to determine whether they should be regulated
under the FDCA's definition of a drug. The Mathews court found that in determining
whether a drug is intended for use as a drug, the FDA is not bound by
manufacturer's subjective claims but may also rely on objective evidence. See id. at
334. The use of a drug for exclusively therapeutic purposes is sufficient to show
intent for use in the treatment of disease. See id. at 1335. Ultimately, the appellate
court found that the FDA could assert jurisdiction over high dosage vitamins. See id.
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administrative agency is clearly free to revise its
interpretations."112 The ASH court noted, "[niothing in this
opinion should suggest that [the FDA] is irrevocably bound by
any long-standing interpretation and representations thereof to
the legislative branch." 13  Although the FDA declined
jurisdiction over nicotine containing products in 1980, it had the
ability to alter its position if and when evidence appeared that
made the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction timely and proper.114
The Coyne court buttressed the FDA's statutory
interpretation by clarifying that the FDCA was intended to
broaden former food and drug laws." 5 The intent of Congress to
broaden the statutory definition of a drug is illustrated in United
States v. Bacto-Unidisk."6 The Supreme Court noted, after
examining the product at hand and medical definitions of "drug,"
that "Congress intended to define 'drug' far more broadly than
does the medical profession."117  Bacto-Unidisk laid the
foundation for Coyne's reasoning that if Congress intended a
strictly medical usage for the term "drug," it would have
explicitly stated so in the FDCA. 118
at 338. The Dietary Supplement and Health Education Act is an example of
legislation that was enacted in part due to health concerns and new scientific
evidence. See Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321n
(1994)). See Stephen H. McNamara, Dietary Supplements of Botanicals and Other
Substances: A New Era of Regulation, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341, 341 (1995)
(describing congressional intent to restrict the FDA's regulatory authority over
dietary supplements).
112 Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1384 (quoting Action on Smoking &
Health, 655 F.2d at 242).
113 Action on Smoking & Health, 655 F.2d at 242 n.10.
114 See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1384; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)
(recognizing the need for agencies to adapt their rules and policies to changing
circumstances); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1991) (noting that an agency
may revise its earlier statutory interpretation).
115 See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1381; see also H.R. REP. No. 75-2139,
at 2 (1938).
116 394 U.S. 784 (1969). The Supreme Court examined whether or not antibiotic
sensitivity disks, used to determine the proper antibiotic to administer to patients
would be considered a "drug" under the FDCA. See id. at 787-88. The product never
touched the body, but was used in connection with the patient's specimen. See id. at
787.
117 Id. at 793. The Supreme Court went on to add that the addition of a "device"
definition that almost paralleled the "drug" definition helped the Court reach this
conclusion. See id.
118 See id. at 793-94.
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The Coyne court noted that another purpose of the FDCA
was to protect the public from problematic devices. 119 Clearly,
the FDCA is an act aimed at public protection. 120  The
appearance of internal manufacturer memoranda listing the
dangers of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco' 2' bolsters the public
protection basis of the FDCA, thus qualifying nicotine as a
regulated product. The district court in Coyne correctly found
the FDA's statutory interpretation acceptable. 122
Finding that the FDA had proper jurisdiction is consistent
with the legislative history. The hurdle of regulation still lingers,
leaving both proponents and adversaries of the FDA's tobacco
regulation wondering what comes next.
III. CONSUMER USE AS A FACTOR IN THE DETERMINATION OF
WHETHER THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION HAS THE LEGAL
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE TOBACCO
Tobacco companies assert that the FDA cannot consider
consumer use in determining whether tobacco products meet the
"drug" or "device" criteria.123  The district court in Coyne
disagreed, finding that actual consumer use was a vital factor in
analyzing whether the FDA has jurisdiction over tobacco
products. 124 The Brown & Williamson courts agreed with the
manufacturers and did not analyze the role of actual consumer
use in determining the FDA's jurisdiction over tobacco
products.125 The discrepancy between the appellate and district
courts on the issue of actual consumer use plays a major role in
the determination of which court has the most persuasive, and
119 See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1392-93.
120 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
121 See Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 4, at 44,847-915
(discussing statements and research of each of the major cigarette companies and
the Council for Tobacco Research, which shows that cigarette manufacturers know of
the dangers of tobacco use, and that they intend their products to have
pharmacological effects on the bodies of the consumers); see also id. at 45,098-150
(discussing evidence from smokeless tobacco producers on intentional "graduation"
of nicotine levels to promote tolerance and addiction).
122 See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1393.
123 See id. at 1391; see also Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 4,
at 45,160-61.
124 See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1391-92 (stating that the cases relied
upon by the tobacco companies are not on point).
125 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. at 1299, affg 153
F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 1998).
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perhaps, most politically correct analysis. The determination of
the proper analysis of the FDA's jurisdiction over tobacco
products now lies with Congress.
Previous courts have found that actual consumer use plays
an important role in determining FDA jurisdiction.1' For
example, the court in United States v. 22 Devices "The Ster-O-
Lizer MD-200" 27 addressed whether a product used to sterilize
surgical equipment could be regulated by the FDA as a device. 12
The district court noted, "[tihe objective intent referred to in the
regulation 129 may be shown not only by a product's labeling
claims, advertising or written statements relating to the
circumstances of a product's distribution,... but also by a
product's actual use."130 The Ster-O-Lizer case illustrated that
objective intent looks further than a product's label, into the
heart of its purpose. 13 1
The ASH court noted that statutory intent could be inferred
when consumers use a product exclusively and with a specific
purpose. 132 A finding that consumers use cigarettes as a drug
corroborates the FDA's claims of actual use. The FDA found that
77% to 92% of smokers and 75% of smokeless tobacco users are
addicted to nicotine.133 According to the FDA, one third to one
half of young smokers use smoking for weight control, and 50% of
r2 See, e.g., United States v. 22 Rectangular or Cylindrical Finished Devices,
More or Less, "The Ster-O-Lizer MD-200," Halogenic Products Co., 714 F. Supp.
1159, 1165 (D. Utah 1989) [hereinafter Ster-O-Lizer] (holding that the test to see if a
product is a device, and, thus, subject to FDA jurisdiction, is based "solely on the
product's intended use"); see also National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger,
512 F.2d 688, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that near exclusive consumer use is
evidence of intended use).
127 714 F. Supp. 1159 (D. Utah 1989).
m8 See id. at 1161.
129 See 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (1998) (stating that the objective intent of the
manufacturer can be determined by examining the manufacturer's expressions, the
way in which they distribute the product, and the purpose behind their actions).
130 Ster-O-Lizer, 714 F. Supp. at 1165. The court examined, in conjunction with
device definitions, those provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations that discuss
the meaning of"intended use," including volume 21, sections 801.4, 801.5, 801.119,
801.122. See id. The sections refer to intended use as " 'the objective intent of the
persons legally responsible for the labeling of devices'" and how this objective intent
can be derived. Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (1998)) (emphasis added).
131 See id.
132 See Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 240 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
'33 See Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 4, at 44,635-36.
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young people utilize smokeless tobacco for relaxation.134 FDA
findings also indicate that of those smokers aged ten to twenty-
two, 70% use cigarettes for relaxation.135 Thus, actual consumer
use substantiates use that affects the structure or function of the
body. Agnew v. United States136 confirmed that "intended for
use" could be inferred from one's actions137 by concluding that
"[tihe law presumes that every man intends the legitimate
consequence of his own acts."138 The proposition that one's
actions foretell intention has long been a part of this legal theory
and should similarly apply to tobacco product regulation.
IV. FORESEEABILITY AS A FACTOR IN GRANTING THE FDA THE
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
Another factor in the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco products is based on the foreseeable effects of
tobacco products, which can be used to prove a manufacturer's
intent. 39  FDA evidence has indicated that manufacturers'
design of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, combined with a
potent dosage of nicotine, show that they foresaw consumer
addiction.140  The district court in Coyne made clear that,
although Congress did not specifically state that foreseeable use
could be considered for determining intended use, nothing
prohibits it.'4' The court of appeals and the United States
Supreme Court did not address foreseeable use in their tightly
woven opinions. 142
The lack of discussion of foreseeable use has left the FDA
and proponents of the FDA's jurisdiction over tobacco without
134 See id. at 44,635-36.
15 See id. at 44,636.
136 165 U.S. 36 (1897).
137 See id. at 53.
138 Id.
139 See Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 4, at 44,633-34
(discussing the pharmacological effects of tobacco on the human body, such as the
addictive nature of nicotine, and that the tobacco industry's denial of such effects
can not be believed in light of the overwhelming scientific evidence).
140 See id. at 44,636-42.
141 See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1391 (M.D.N.C. 1991),
rev'd sub nom., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir.
1998), affd 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
142 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. at 1299-1300




one of their most powerful and convincing arguments for the
assertion of jurisdiction to regulate tobacco. The Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals in Brown & Williamson appellate
courts based their decisions on the fact that Congress has had
many instances to act on tobacco regulation, and its inaction, as
applied to the FDA, indicated specific intent to deny the agency
regulatory authority.143
The foreseeability test that the FDA relied on stems from
evidence that nicotine is addictive and causes "significant
pharmacological effects."144 The FDA also noted that nicotine
could have mood altering effects and other qualities that parallel
those of opiates. 45 Today, findings of the powerful, addictive
nature of nicotine emanate from health agencies. 46 Nicotine is
identified by all the pertinent expert organizations as one of the
few truly dependence-producing drugs, occupying the list with
cocaine, heroin, and alcohol. 47 Thus, the "scientific consensus"
and consumer use patterns indicate that manufacturers do
foresee that their products have addictive qualities and that
consumers use tobacco products for their pharmacological
properties.
V. INTERNAL MANUFACTURERS' MEMORANDA AS A FACTOR IN FDA
REGULATION
Perhaps the most compelling evidence of manufacturers'
intent is their memoranda. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit and
the United States Supreme Court did not squarely address this
issue. The Fourth Circuit simply concluded that manufacturers
do not intend for their products to be used as a "drug" or
"device." 148 The FDA relied on research and memoranda from
143 See id. at 1306-14, affg 153 F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 1998); see also supra note
49 and accompanying text.
144 Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 4, at 44,634.
145 See id. at 44,635.
146 See id. at 44,634 (noting that, "[s]ince 1980, nicotine in tobacco products has
also been recognized as addictive by the U.S. Surgeon General (1986 and 1988), the
American Psychological Association (1988), the Royal Society of Canada (1989), the
World Health Organization (1992), the American Medical Association (1993), and
the Medical Research Council in the United Kingdom (1994)").
147 See id. at 44,701-12 (discussing the criteria and classification of many
addictive substances, including nicotine).
148 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 153 F.3d at 160-161 (4th Cir. 1998)
(reasoning that Congress has spoken directly through tobacco-specific legislation),
aff/d 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
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tobacco companies to demonstrate recognition that nicotine has
powerful pharmacological effects.149 For example, according to
the FDA's Executive Summary, manufacturers recognized that
nicotine is " 'a powerful pharmacological agent with multiple
sites of action' and 'a physiologically active... substance...
[which] alters the state of the smoker by becoming a
neurotransmitter and a stimulant.' "150 Even in 1996, when the
FDA chose to assert its regulatory jurisdiction over tobacco
products, evidence existed which proved manufacturers'
knowledge of nicotine's powerful effects.
Since 1996, tobacco litigation has resulted in more company
documents surfacing that reveal manufacturer knowledge about
the addictive nature of their product.151 For example, internal
memoranda from a cigarette producer revealed that several tests
were done in the late 1970's and early 1980's to " '[d]etermine the
minimum level of nicotine that will allow continued smoking' "
and also note that "smoking is 'both physiologically and
psychologically motivated,' and that when nicotine levels drop too
low 'smokers will quit.' "152 Even as litigation continues
regarding whether tobacco is a drug or device, these
manufacturer documents reveal that they clearly knew their
products both affected the structure and function of the body and
were used by consumers as drug delivery devices.
FDA findings also revealed that tobacco companies
specifically designed their products to deliver "a
pharmacologically active dose of nicotine to the smoker."153
Manufacturer experiments included tests on how to negotiate
nicotine and tar levels as well as ammonia manipulation for
increasing "free" nicotine levels to smokers. 154 The FDA contends
149 See Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 4, at 44,637.
150 Id. (citing comments regarding nicotine's addictive qualities in Philip Morris'
internal documents).
151 Tobacco companies such as Brown & Williamson acknowledged the dangers
of smoking and launched a web site to educate consumers on the health risks of
smoking. See Suein L. Hwang, Tobacco Firm Gives Frank Advice Online, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 9, 1999, at B1.
152 Doug Campbell, Lorillard Documents Revealing: Documents Discuss Nicotine
Levels and Marketing to Teens, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, June 28, 1998, at Al,
A8 (citation omitted).
153 Nicotine: Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 4, at 44,640-41. The FDA
included evidence of blending techniques and filter/ventilation systems that deliver
high amounts of nicotine. See id. at 44,641.
1- See id. at 44,641.
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that tobacco companies intended for their products to be used as
drug delivery devices. 155
VI. IS THERE A SIMPLE ANSWER TO REGULATION?
The Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit's failure to find
that the FDA had jurisdiction over tobacco products stemmed
directly from congressional inaction and prior actions by the FDA
negating assertion of jurisdiction. 15 6 Both courts determined that
the FDA was "attempting to stretch the Act beyond the scope
intended by Congress."157 The courts also found that the agency's
rationale for finding authority to regulate tobacco products would
require the FDA to ban cigarettes. Such a finding was
inconsistent with one of its missions established by Congress-to
ensure the safety and efficiency of drugs and devices.158 The
courts also noted that the regulations proposed by the FDA
conflicted with the current regulatory practice of eliminating
dangerous drugs.159 Furthermore, the regulations were contrary
to the agency's past stance that the FDA was not the proper
authority to regulate tobacco products.160 It appears that the
appellate court's reasons are inconsistent with the FDA's ability
to conform to changing times and adapt regulatory techniques to
meet new scientific findings.
Past agency policy regarding tobacco should not be held to
dictate all future regulatory schemes. 161 New findings show,
155 See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1392 (M.D.N.C. 1997),
rev'd sub nor., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA,153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir
1998), aff'd 120 S. Ct 1291 (2000).
156 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. at 1306-14, affg
153 F.3d 155, 168-71 (4th Cir. 1998).
157 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d at 167 (4th Cir. 1998),
affd, 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
1i See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. at 1297-99
(opining that the FDA wants to assert jurisdiction in order to regulate an industry
constituting a significant portion of the American economy and that the FDA would
then have the authority to ban cigarettes and all smokeless tobacco), af/g 153 F.3d
155, 166-67 (4th Cir. 1998).
169 See id. (noting that "based on the FDA's characterization of tobacco products
as unsafe, it is impossible to create regulations which will provide a reasonable
assurance of safety[,]" and therefore it is impossible for the FDA to promulgate
regulations that comply with the FDCA).
10 See id.
161 See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1384 (M.D.N.C. 1997),
rev'd sub nom., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.2d 155 (4th Cir.
1998), affd 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
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unlike past agency information, that smoking affects the
structure and function of the body.162 Secondary findings show
manufacturers intend this to be the case. 163 The argument that
congressional intent prohibits FDA regulation over tobacco
products is also misplaced. Congress's failure to explicitly extend
to the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco does not mean that
regulatory activity is barred indefinitely. 164 The regulatory
techniques, though controversial, fulfill the overall intent of the
FDCA: to protect consumers who are "unable to protect
themselves."165
If manufacturers discover a formula to make safer cigarettes,
should the FDA regulate this type of product?166 If the FDA can
regulate these products, will smoking increase?167 These are only
a few questions regarding FDA regulation. Upon examination of
these questions, commentators have agreed that significant price
increases might deter smoking and, hence, reduce nicotine
addiction in the United States.168
Critics have noted that the best methods of cigarette control
are negative advertisements, rather than a ban on specific
advertisement forms.169 Perhaps this is a more realistic answer
162 See Regulations Restricting the Sale of Tobacco, supra note 7, at 44,397 (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, and 897) ("FDA has determined
that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are intended to affect the structure or function
of the body, within the meaning of the act's definitions of 'drug' and 'device.' The
nicotine in cigarettes and smokeless tobacco is a 'drug,' which produces significant
pharmacological effects in consumers.").
163 See id. at 44,630 (noting that "[mlanufacturers of cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco know that nicotine in their products causes pharmacological effects in
consumers, including addiction to nicotine and mood alteration, and that consumers
use their products primarily to obtain the pharmacological effects of nicotine").
164 See Coyne Beahm, Inc., 966 F. Supp. at 1384 (finding that "the text of the
FDCA, its legislative history, and the body of evidence consisting of FDA's
representations to Congress, unenacted bills, and statements by members of
Congress do not clearly indicate that Congress intended to withhold from FDA the
authority to regulate tobacco products").
165 Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948).
166 See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, A Critique of the Proposed Tobacco
Resolution and a Suggested Alternative, 41 L. QUAD. NOTES 76, 81 (1998).
167 See id.
168 See id. (noting that "[t]he proposed resolution arguably includes an incentive-
based component, insofar as the costs imposed on manufacturers are required to be
passed through to consumers in the form of a price hike").
169 See Mark A.R. Kleiman & Aaron J. Saiger, Drug Legalization: The
Importance of Asking the Right Question, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 527, 549 (1990)
(stating that negative advertising is a more powerful deterrent to drug abuse than a
ban on advertising).
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to regulation. Nevertheless, the answer to regulatory techniques
is a complex issue due to the powerful social implications
presented by tobacco use.170 The prevention of smoking must be
delicately handled and in a manner suitable to government
objectives and existing regulatory techniques. Tobacco addiction,
however, can no longer be ignored. A multifaceted examination
of consumer use, foreseeability, and closeted manufacturer
findings, must be considered when determining whether tobacco
or any other product meets the "drug" or "device" criteria and
should hence, be regulated.
How should Congress be guided? The United States
Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit relied on the FDA's prior
regulatory schemes, congressional inaction, and tobacco-specific
legislation. 7 1 That is, these courts focused on historical actions
by the FDA and congressional inaction and concluded that the
FDA "exceeded the authority granted to it by Congress."17 2 In so
doing, the FDA's rulemaking to regulate tobacco as a "drug,"
"device" or "combination product" could not stand.7 3 The follow-
up examination of the FDA's past bouts with tobacco regulation
is also problematic. The Fourth Circuit ignored, and the United
States Supreme Court did not reach the issue of, newly acquired
evidence regarding the FDA's jurisdiction over tobacco and the
Agency's regulatory premise.174
Comparison of the district court's decision with that of the
United States Supreme Court leads to the conclusion that Coyne
used a more comprehensive analysis. Coyne advanced the
jurisdictional analysis a step past the FDA's prior actions and
congressional inaction.175  In its analysis, the Coyne court
170 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1306-10
(2000) (explaining that such a delegation by Congress would have widespread
economic and political implications).
171 See id., affg 153 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 1998).
172 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 176 (4th Cir.
1998), affd 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000). An "ultra vires" action is one that is
unauthorized. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 101-
02 (1998).
173 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. at 1297-98, af'g
153 F.3d at 176.
174 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d. at 161 (ignoring
the FDA's evidence that tobacco was intended to effect the body, and therefore
tobacco products fall under the literal definitions of drug or device), affd 120 S. Ct.
1291 (2000).
175 See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1381 (M.D.N.C. 1997),
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determined that tobacco products fall within the "drug" or
"device" definition of the FDCA.176 Coyne also concluded "that
[the] FDA adequately and properly supported its finding of
intended use with evidence of foreseeability and consumer
use."177 The Coyne analysis appears more complete and legally
realistic and serves as a sound basis for Congress to give the
FDA authority to regulate tobacco.
CONCLUSION
Congress, as the court did in Coyne, must look at the "big
picture" regarding tobacco regulation. Although prior tobacco
legislation and congressional inaction remain important
considerations, they do not solely justify the conclusion that the
FDA lacks authority to regulate tobacco. Undoubtedly, a
regulatory scheme with adequate resources could help curb
America's deadliest preventable killer. Obviously, this is now up
to Congress to do so through specific legislation affording FDA an
explicit grant of authority.
rev'd sub noma., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.2d 155 (4th Cir.
1998), affd 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
176 See id. at 1388.
177 Id. at 1392.
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